Okoe v. The Republic [1976] 1 GLR 80-99

Material Facts:

The applicant was arraigned before the Circuit Court for forcibly entering into land with violence. He applied for bail pending trial on grounds that he would appear to stand trial and that his health was deteriorating. The application was denied, and he appealed. At the appeal, he argued that the trial judge refused bail as punishment because he did not like the way he is alleged to have behaved. The bail was opposed by the Republic on grounds that the applicant is likely to commit further acts of forcible entry, that there have been many violent acts in the country and there must be an end to them, and that the alleged acts of the applicant show that he had not been sympathetic to his fellow men and had taken the law into his own hands.

Issue:

Whether or not the application for bail should be granted.

Holding:

The application for bail should be granted.

Ratio Decidendi:

In Ghana, an accused person has a right to bail on grounds that he is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty, as contained in Article 20 (2) (b) of our Constitution, 1969. This right has been subject to regulation. Presently, Section 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) provides such regulation. Under this section, the court is given discretion to admit a person on bail, enjoined to not refuse bail as a punishment, and prevented from granting bail in certain cases such as murder and treason, among others.

In the present case, the grounds upon which the state opposes the grant of bail to the applicant reveal that bail is being used as punishment. In the case of R. v. Rose [1895-1899] All E.R. Rep. 350, Lord Russell advanced that:

It cannot be too strongly impressed on the magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at the trial.

A similar provision is made in Section 96(4). In the opinion of the court, “all the grounds clearly advocate the use of the bail power as a punitive measure. This is clearly against the provisions of section 96 (4) of Act 30, and for that reason they must all fail.”

The court, in commenting on Section 96 and its relationship with Article 15(3)(b) and (4) of the Constitution, said:

In my opinion with the exception of the few principles I have criticised and drawn attention to, section 96 of Act 30 as amended by N.R.C.D. 309 consolidates substantially, the common law principles governing the grant of bail when a person is brought to court and when there is no question of delay in his prosecution. Once there is an unreasonable delay in prosecuting the case then section 96 of Act 30 is in my view inapplicable and article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1969, becomes applicable and in such a situation, bail in all cases must be given subject only to the conditions prescribed in the articles.

Principles in Case:

1. Bail should not be withheld as a punishment.

2. If there is unreasonable delay in trying a case, the accused should be granted bail.